The provision of retail payment services is complex with many participants engaging in a series of interrelated bilateral transactions and subject to large economies of scale and scope along with strong adoption, usage and network externalities. This makes sound public policy difficult. We focus on three types of market interventions for various countries. We argue that intervention into payment markets should concentrate on the removal of entry barriers in payment markets and providing greater incentives to adopt efficient payment instruments without stifling private sector investment in more efficient payment technologies over the long term. While the theoretical literature on the economics of payment cards is growing, the empirical literature is yet too limited to provide much guidance to public authorities. Eventually, the outcomes from different types of market interventions will provide a useful "natural experiment" to refute or validate the various theories of the economics of payments.
INTRODUCTION
Payment systems are evolving rapidly and are more complex than ever before in terms of global connectivity and the rules and regulations that govern them. They are a critical component of any financial system infrastructure-the "plumbing"-of any well-functioning economy. In this chapter, we will concentrate on market interventions in retail payment markets with particular focus on payment cards. Payment cards include cards that access transaction accounts, known as debit cards, cards that access lines of credit, known as credit cards, and cards that are prefunded, known as prepaid cards. Payment card usage has increased dramatically over the last two decades in most advanced economies. This increased usage has primarily resulted in the displacement cash and check transactions. In addition, the rapid growth of internet transactions has increased the attractiveness of card-based transactions.
We focus on three types of market interventions. First, we analyze the impact of removing pricing restrictions placed on merchants that prevent them from setting different prices based on the payment instrument used to make purchases. Second, we summarize the impact on adoption and usage of payment cards when public authorities mandate caps on interchange fees-the fees paid by the payer's financial institution to the payee's financial institution. Third, we discuss the forced acceptance of all types of payment cards belonging to a single payment network, i.e. credit, debit, and prepaid, when merchants enter into contracts with acquirers. Such rules are often called honor-all-cards rules. While our focus is on payment cards, various pricing policies used to reach critical mass and steal market share from other payment instruments may also be valid for other types of payment instruments. 2 For many observers, the pace of innovation, the displacement of paper-based payments with electronic substitutes, and the profitability of payment providers demonstrate how vibrant and adaptive the payment card industry has been with limited involvement by public authorities.
Other observers argue that payment networks should be financial market utilities and regulated to limit the profits of network operators and payment providers. The economic justification for public intervention arises when there is market failure.
3 For example, in the United States, the ability to electronically exchange check images instead of original paper checks on a wide scale in the clearing and settlement process was enabled by the Check Clearing for the 21 st Century Act passed by Congress in 2003. 4 Once the Act was implemented, payment providers invested in new technologies and for the most part, eliminated the exchange of original or substitute paper-based images resulting in a more efficient electronic interbank processing of checks.
Today, some financial institutions are allowing customers to take pictures of their checks with their mobile phones that they receive and send images for deposit. Prior to the Act, check processors were reluctant to invest in new image technologies and abandon their paper check sorters.
Many payment markets exhibit a combination of market failures. First, there may be coordination problems among the large number of participants preventing large capital expenditures or the establishment of industry standards inhibiting long-run growth and development such as the processing of electronic check images instead of paper checks. Second, 2 Financial market utilities, such as payment systems, central securities depositories, and central counterparties, are entities that provide the essential infrastructure to clear and settle payments and other financial transactions, upon which the financial markets and the broader economy rely to function effectively. 3 Economists are generally agnostic on how profits are shared by economic agents for a given level of output for goods and services. They are concerned with the aggregate welfare of all economic agents. In other words, the possibility to increase the size of the pie is more important than how the pie is divided among economic agents at a given level of output for goods and services. 4 A key driver of this legislation was the stoppage of check processing after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks until planes were allowed to fly again. Note that the Act only mandated the exchange of paper-based substitute images instead of the original paper check written by the payer.
3 strong network effects exist in the provision of payment services because of the connectivity required between millions of payees, payers, financial institutions and payment network operators. 5 Third, considerable scale and scope economies in retail payment systems may lead to highly concentrated markets with few payment networks because of high barriers to entry for new payment networks.
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Economies of scale and scope along with network effects may result in few payment network operators raising potential concerns of significant pricing power. Fourth, "two-sided" network effects cause further interdependencies that affect the pricing structure of payment instruments, in particular the setting of interchange fees-the fee paid by the payee's bank to the payer's bank-in payment card markets. 7 Economic models of two-sided markets suggest that competition among network operators may result in fee structures that are less desirable than those set by a monopoly network. Fifth, consumer and merchant incentives to keep vital payment information secure and investments into fraud mitigation systems by payment providers and network operators may not be aligned to achieve the socially desirable level of prudent behavior by consumers and merchants to protect vital payment data and sufficient investment in fraud detection and prompt resolution technologies by payment providers.
The motivation of public authorities to intervene in payment card markets varies by country. First, public authorities may intervene to improve the incentives to use more efficient 5 Network effects exist when the value of a good or service to consumers increases as the number of consumers using the product increases. The classic example used in network economics is the fax machine. The value of fax machines increase as the number of fax machine owners increase because faxes can be use to connect to more locations. 6 Economies of scale exist when the average cost of production decreases as the quantity produced increases. Economies of scope exist when the joint costs of providing various payment and financial services together are lower than the "stand-alone" costs of providing these services separately. 7 Rochet and Tirole (2006) define a two-sided market as a market where not only the total price of the service but also the price structure (i.e. the share that each type of end-user pays of the total price) affects the total volume of transactions. In addition, end-users such as consumers and merchants are unable to negotiate prices based on costs to participate on a platform. Furthermore, this two-sided nature may limit the pricing power of payment providers. 8 For a review of these models, see Bolt and Chakravorti (2008b We conclude that the justification to regulate fees is difficult at best given the lack of empirical evidence that conclusively shows the impact of fee regulation on consumers, merchants, financial institutions and investment in future innovations. Furthermore, the costbased approach that is often used to regulate these fees ignores the economics of two-sided markets arguing that cross-subsidies among payment system participants may be necessary especially in mature payment card markets. However, public authorities should encourage the removal of merchant pricing restrictions such as the inability to charge different prices based on the instrument used to make payment. When consumers are faced with price incentives that more accurately reflect the underlying cost differences between payment instruments, they are 9 We define efficient payment instruments as payment instruments that not only use the least economic resources but we also take into account the economic benefits extended which in some cases may not be measured in monetary terms. For example, although credit cards may be the most expensive payment instrument to accept for merchants, credit provides economic benefits that cannot be ignored when considering these costs. Chakravorti and To (2007) However, the U.S.
merchant community has argued that these incentives result in the usage of more costly payment instruments and that merchants fund these rewards. Who pays for credit card rewards and whether such cross subsidies are justified continue to be hotly debated. Chakravorti and Emmons (2003) suggest that this cross subsidy comes from consumers that revolve.
Second, a consumer makes a purchase from a merchant using a payment card if the merchant has previously established a relationship with a financial institution to convert payment card receipts into bank deposits. A benefit that the merchant receives when accepting payment cards is a guarantee of payment if certain procedures are followed. For all payment card transactions, there are authentication and authorization procedures. The authentication process 11 There are different types of prepaid cards. We limit our discussion to general-purpose network branded prepaid cards that are issued by the major payment network operators. For a discussion of prepaid cards, see Chakravorti and Lubasi (2006) . 12 Carbó Valverde and Liñares Zegarra (2009) and Ching and Hayashi (2010) study the impact of credit card rewards on the usage of other payment instruments. Agarwal, Chakravorti, and Lunn (2010) study rewards and their impact on credit card substitution and increased spending.
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validates the cardholder and insures against unauthorized payments. Authentication can be achieved by signature, personal identification number, or other means.
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The financial institution authorizes the amount of the transaction based on funds in the account or availability of credit lines. By using a real time authorization, payment card issuers are able to eliminate payments where the account does not have sufficient funds or access to credit.
14 Generally, merchants charge the same price regardless of the type of payment instrument used to make purchases. Often merchants are restricted from charging more for payment card purchases by the card network or by certain laws.
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These rules are called no-surcharge rules. In the United States, the Truth-in-Lending Act enacted in 1968 as part of the Consumer Protection
Act and implemented as Federal Reserve Regulation Z initially restricted the charging of instrument-contingent prices. We define instrument-contingent prices as prices set by merchants for goods and services that are based on the type of instrument used to make the purchase.
Subsequent revisions to Regulation Z and a part of the DFA have increased the ability of merchants to offer discounts for purchases made with certain payment instruments.
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Third, the merchant either pays a fixed per transaction fee (more common for debit cards) or a proportion of the total purchase amount, known as the merchant discount fee (more common for credit cards), to its acquirer. 17 For credit cards, the merchant discount can range from one percent to five percent depending on the type of transaction, type of merchant, and type of card, 13 In some instances, U.S. card issuers may force cardholders to call and answer questions regarding previous addresses lived at, recent purchases made, and cars owned in the past before their cards can be used as an additional security measure. 14 The checking of funds or credit line availability is not similarly bundled by the financial institution for check and ACH debit payments, where ACH payments are initiated by the receiver of payments. Receivers of checks may opt for third-party check authorization and guarantee systems. 15 For example, some U.S. state laws prevent merchants from surcharging for certain payment card purchases. 16 For more discussion about U.S. instrument-contingent pricing history, see Chakravorti and Shah (2003) . 17 Shy and Wang (2011) suggest that ad valorum fees may be more efficient in certain cases.
8 if the merchant can swipe the physical card or not, and other factors.
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This fee is greater than the interchange fee and generally increases or decreases as the interchange fee increases or decreases, respectively. These fees are bilaterally set between the acquirer and issuer. In the United States, some types of merchants pay fees that are almost identical to the interchange fees.
This linkage between the interchange fee and the merchant fee is the main reason that merchants have lobbied legislatures and antitrust authorities globally to reduce interchange fees.
Fourth, acquirers pay interchange fees to issuers. These fees can either be ad valorem,
proportional to the value of the transaction, or fixed regardless of the purchase amount. In addition, the fee may differ based on the type of merchant, the type of card, and whether card is present or not. The interchange fee is set at the network level. Prior to the recent restructuring of MasterCard and Visa into for-profit corporations, both operated as association of member banks. As such, a network of competitors set interchange fees that they charged one another resulting in antitrust scrutiny on the grounds of collectively setting prices. As part of one of the first U.S. antitrust challenges to the setting of interchange fees where Visa was able to successfully defend its setting of interchange fees, Baxter (1983) argued that the interchange fee were critical for payment cards to exist because consumers may have been reluctant to pay their share of the cost because of the perceived benefits of card use whereas merchants may have been willing to pay more than their cost resulting in both consumers and merchants being better off.
18 When the first charge card (payment cards that require full payment at the end of the payment cycle) was introduced in 1949 by Dinners Club, the merchant discount was set at seven percent. This fee was based on a conversation by its founders with a restaurant owner about how much the restaurant was willing to pay for additional customers brought in by Diners Club membership. This feature has most recently been unbundled by Groupon that provides discounts at certain stores and restaurants resulting in increased sales for participating businesses.
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THE ROLE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES
The role of public authorities in the operation and oversight of retail payment systems especially central banks has been evolving over time. acceptance of all payment products issued by a given network. The two card networks agreed to unbundle their payment products in an out-of-court settlement. The DFA gives the authority to the Federal Reserve Board to set rules regarding the level of debit card interchange fees. In this chapter, when we refer to public authorities, we include any public entity that can or has been
given the authority to intervene in payment markets.
MARKET INTERVENTION AND EFFICIENCY
Intervention by the public authorities into payment card markets differs by country. 19 We will focus on three types of the market interventions that were undertaken by public authorities to increase the efficiency of the payment market. In particular, we will discuss the removal of merchant pricing restrictions, regulation of interchange fees, and decoupling of merchant acceptance of all types of payment cards belonging to a single payment network operator.
Our analysis suggests that there is no "one-size-fits-all" strategy for intervention into payment card markets because of differences in adoption of payment forms, legal systems, and 19 For a discussion about the role of public authorities in retail payment systems, see .
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level of competition in banking and the broader economy. Our goal is to highlight specific market interventions and their effects on overall efficiency of the payment market.
Removal of no-surcharge policies
There are several countries where merchants are able to surcharge payment card transactions. In most cases, card networks prohibit merchants from surcharging consumers for their payment card purchases. Most of the academic research suggests that if merchants are allowed to surcharge, the level of the interchange fee would be neutral. An interchange fee is neutral when changing the level of the fee has no impact on card adoption or usage. If the interchange fee is neutral, regulating it would have no impact on payment card usage. We will discuss whether merchants actually surcharge or post differential prices when allowed to do so.
This discussion should inform the debate of the willingness and ability of merchants to pass on costs directly to payment card users to potentially reduce cross-subsidies between consumers that use payment cards and those that do not. 20 Many public authorities and the merchant community have questioned why these cross subsidies should exist. We will discuss the ability of merchants to charge instrument-contingent pricing in three countries: Australia, the United States, and the Of course, even those credit card users who pay off their balances every month may benefit from short-term loans because they do not have funds in their accounts when making their purchases but their incomes will arrive before the credit card bill is due. Simon, Smith, and West (2010) find that those consumers that have an interest free period credit card, i.e. do not carry credit card balances month-to-month, are less likely to use their debit cards than those that do not have access to such a credit card.
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United States
In the United States, merchants are allowed to offer cash discounts but may not be allowed to surcharge credit card transactions. In the 1980s, many U.S. gas stations explicitly posted cash and credit card prices. Barron, Staten, and Umbeck (1992) report that gas station operators imposed instrument-contingent pricing when their credit card processing costs were high but later abandoned this practice when acceptance costs decreased because of new technologies such as electronic terminals at the point of sale suggesting that the benefits of accepting payment cards were greater than the costs to accept them. Recently, some gas stations brought back price differentiation based on payment instrument type, citing the rapid rise in gas prices and declining profit margins.
U.S. consumers are rarely confronted with instrument-contingent pricing at the point of sale when they make purchases although there may be under-the-table arrangements where cash discounts may be offered. However, a part of the DFA expands the ability of merchants to steer consumers with price incentives. U.S. merchants will be allowed to offer discounts on any type of payment instrument vis-à-vis another type of instrument but may not offer discounts within a class of payment instruments. For example, a merchant may not offer a different discount for a MasterCard credit card than a Visa credit card.
The Netherlands
In some instances, public authorities may prefer if merchants did not surcharge certain types of transactions so as to increase the overall efficiency of the payment market by 14 eliminating incentives to use more costly payment instruments such as cash.
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For example, Bolt, Jonker, and van Renselaar (2010) find that a significant number of merchants surcharge debit transactions vis-à-vis cash in the Netherlands. Debit card surcharges are widely assessed when purchases are below 10 euro, suggesting that merchants are unwilling to pay fixed transaction fees below this threshold. Bolt, Jonker, and van Renselaar state that merchants may surcharge up to four times their debit card fee. In addition, when debit card surcharges are removed, consumers start using their debit cards for these small payments, suggesting that merchant price incentives do affect consumer payment choice. In an effort to promote a more efficient payment system, the Dutch central bank has supported a public campaign to encourage retailers to stop surcharging to encourage consumers to use their debit cards for small transactions. This strategy appears to have been successful. In 2009, debit card payments below ten euro accounted for more than 50 percent of the total annual growth of almost 11 percent in debit card volume. Because debit card processing is a scale business, average transaction costs fall as the number of debit transactions increase. An agreement between the payment network and merchants was reached to pass on some of the cost savings from increased volume to merchants.
The ability for merchants to charge different prices is a powerful incentive to convince consumers to use a certain payment instrument. In reality, few merchants may surcharge or discount card transactions depending on expected benefits and their underlying cost structures.
In some instances, surcharges may result in less efficient payment use as evidenced in the Dutch example suggesting a potential adverse problem whereby merchants impose higher surcharges than their costs. It remains an economic puzzle as to why most merchants do not set instrument-22 Amromin and Chakravorti (2009) suggest that there may be other benefits to cash acceptance such as tax avoidance. Often the anonymity feature of cash is highly valued by consumers such that in extreme cases, they may be willing to pay more when using cash.
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contingent pricing when they are allowed to do so to offset fees that they pay to their payment providers.
Regulation of interchange fees
There are several jurisdictions where interchange fees were directly regulated or significant pressure was exerted by the public authorities on networks to reduce their interchange fees.
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In this section, we will discuss the actual and potential impact of interventions in four jurisdictions-Australia, Spain, the European Union, and the United States.
Australia
In 2002 Commission adopted for EU-wide cross-border interchange fees.
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In December 2003, the TDC announced that the networks' special authorization to collectively determine interchange fees would be revoked. During the next two years, the payment card industry made several attempts to maintain their special authorization but failed.
The TDC refused these proposals and required to set interchange fees based only on operating and fraud costs. In addition, the networks had to set different fees for debit and credit cards.
Furthermore, debit card interchange fees would be per-transaction based whereas credit card interchange fees could remain a percentage of the purchase amount. European Commission criteria to set interchange fees has shifted from cost based to the merchant indifference test methodology, which we will describe below.
These regulations had significant impact on debit and credit card usage and made the retail payment system more efficient. Economic theory predicts that there is an optimal interchange fee below and above which the aggregate benefits to consumers, merchants, and payment providers would decrease. Evidence from Spain suggests that the market determined fee was not optimal because adoption and usage of credit cards increased along with issuer revenue as a result of the regulation of interchange fees. Furthermore, they find causal evidence that issuer revenue for both credit and debit cards increased while acquirer revenue remained flat or slightly higher.
European Union
In It is likely that this cap on interchange fees will increase merchant acceptance of debit and credit cards in some European countries where the existing merchant fees are above these new levels and merchant adoption is not complete, that is, less than a 100 percent. There is a tradeoff between attracting additional merchants with lower interchange fees and sufficient revenue necessary to maintain a robust and efficient payment system along with providing sufficient incentives to consumers to use payment cards instead of other alternatives. However, in the long run, with much lower revenues on the payment networks' side, necessary innovations could be stifled in the payment card industry.
29 Unlike the MasterCard agreement, there are instances when the Visa debit caps apply to certain domestic markets within the European Union. 30 The tourist test defines the interchange fee level that leaves a merchant indifferent between different means of payment when an incidental customer ("the tourist") enters the store and pays at the counter.
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As part of the DFA, the U.S. Congress gave the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) the authority to set rules that govern the setting of debit card interchange fees. The amendment to the DFA, commonly known as the Durbin Amendment, was hastily added to the bill in the U.S.
Senate without the usual debate that occurs. Merchant groups were able to successfully lobby the U.S. Congress to force the Federal Reserve to implement interchange fee caps. However, the comment process regarding the actual rule generated an intense debate resulting in a doubling of the initial cap proposed by the Fed of 12 cents. Eventually, in its final rule, the Fed set debit card interchange fees at approximately 24 cents.
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Some market participants such as credit unions and community banks have argued that the reduction in fees would disadvantage smaller financial institutions that issue debit cards even though the DFA has a provision that institutions with assets less than $10 billion would be exempt. Many observers including consumer groups have also argued that consumers would face higher fees and may use other payment alternatives. Although Congress provided exemptions for payment products that are likely to be used by low income families, the payment industry has argued that such regulation is likely to increase the number of unbanked in the United States.
This legislation ignores the two-sided market literature where economists have argued that focusing on costs alone is not appropriate when regulating the payment card industry. In other words, cross subsidies between merchants and consumers may benefit both parties.
Furthermore, some economists have argued that such fee caps would limit innovation and 31 The 24 cent cap is based on a $38 debit card purchase which is the average purchase amount and a 5 basis point adjustment for fraud along with a 1 cent allowance for investment in fraud mitigation systems.
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investment into new technologies that are aimed at improving the efficiency of the retail payment system.
Honor-all-cards rules
In addition to economies of scale, payment networks also enjoy economies of scope. A key component of the payments business is the processing of information and connectivity to financial institutions. Once a payment network has successfully gained connectivity to end users, it can use its network to process various types of payments. In some instances, such networks are leveraged to offer new payment products. For example, the credit card networks leveraged their networks to offer products such as debit and prepaid cards. To encourage adoption, these networks often establish rules that if a merchant accepts one of their payment card products, they must accept all of them. Such rules are commonly called honor-all-cards.
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A payment card network may require that merchants that accept one of its payment products to accept all of its products. In other words, if a merchant accepts a network's credit card, it must accept all debit and prepaid cards from that network. In the United States, around 5 million merchants sued the two major networks, MasterCard and Visa, over the required acceptance of the network's signature-based debit card when accepting the same network's credit card. The merchants argued that PIN-based debit cards offered almost identical features of signature-based cards provided by the credit card networks at substantially lower prices. In addition, merchant fraud costs are substantially less for PIN-based debit transactions. The case was settled out of court. In addition to a monetary settlement, MasterCard and Visa agreed to decouple merchants' acceptance of their debit and credit products. While few merchants have declined one type of card and accepted another type, the decoupling of debit and credit card 32 Rochet and Tirole (2010) provide an economic model that investigates honor-all-cards rules.
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acceptance may have increased bargaining power for merchants in negotiating merchant fees.
Furthermore, the final debit card rule issued by the Federal Reserve Board ignores any differences between the two types of debit cards because both types of cards will be governed by the same fee structure.
As part of the payment system reforms in Australia, MasterCard and Visa were mandated to decouple merchants' acceptance of their debit and credit cards. The Payments System Board (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2008b) is unaware of any merchant that continues to accept debit cards but does not accept credit cards from the same network. This suggests that the regulation did not change the common market practice of accepting all payment products from a given payment network operator. In other words, merchants see value in accepting the suite of payment products from a network operator. However, it is difficult to measure whether the threat of accepting certain payment products and not accepting others has increased the bargaining power of merchants with regard to payment card fees generally.
On the other hand, honor-all-card rules may enable to rapid adoption of new emerging payment technologies such as prepaid cards. For example, the use of prepaid cards for government benefits transfers has been greatly aided by existing payment networks. In fact, the DFA exempted prepaid cards from interchange fee regulation to not stifle growth in the emerging payment market segment. Conversations with U.S. transit authorities suggest that the bundling of payment product may enable them to more rapidly adopt a cashless system because these prepaid cards can be used by unbanked transit riders. Thus, a one-size-fits-all strategy is not appropriate regarding honor-all-cards rules because its existence may benefit the adoption of new product innovations but may result in reduced bargaining power by merchants on more mature payment card products.
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CONCLUSION
The setting of payment fees has attracted a lot attention by public authorities around the world.
The provision of retail payment services is complex with many participants engaging in a series of interrelated bilateral transactions and subject to large economies of scale and scope along with strong adoption, usage and network externalities. This makes sound public policy difficult. The central question is whether the specific circumstances of the retail payment market are such that intervention by public authorities can be expected to improve economic efficiency.
The academic literature on the pricing of payment services that exhibit network externalities along with externalities associated with two-sided markets continues to grow and offers guidance to public authorities. A key contribution of this literature is that the efficiency of payment systems is measured not only by the costs of resources used, but also by the social benefits generated by them. We argue that intervention into payment markets should concentrate on the removal of entry barriers in payment markets and providing greater incentives to adopt efficient payment instruments without stifling private sector investment in more efficient payment technologies over the long term. In some cases, new providers of payment services may not be regulated entities which may pose some challenges to public authorities in terms of maintaining the security and resiliency of such systems. However, these concerns should be weighed against the innovative strategies these new entrants bring to the market. For example, PayPal enabled the acceptance of electronic payments online by sellers that were not able to accept payment cards. Eventually, with partnerships with financial institutions, PayPal was able to provide a safe and reliable payment alternative. The area of mobile payments is now facing similar challenges.
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We find that no single theoretical model is able to capture all the essential elements of the market for payment services. While the theoretical literature on the economics of payment cards is growing, the empirical literature is too limited to provide much guidance to public authorities.
Public authorities around the world are considering or have imposed interchange fee regulations, along with the removal of merchant pricing restrictions based on the type of payment instrument used. Eventually, the outcomes from such interventions will provide a useful "natural experiment" to refute or validate the various theories of the economics of payments.
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